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HITTING BELOW THE BELT: FLORIDA’S TAXATION 
OF PAY-PER-VIEW BOXING PROGRAMMING IS A 
CONTENT-BASED VIOLATION OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
 
Joshua A. Stein* 
Why are you a boxer, Irish featherweight champion Barry 
McGuigan was asked. He said: “I can’t be a poet. I can’t tell 
stories . . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous states authorize a boxing programming tax, imposed 
on “telecast promoters,” and collected on gross receipts of all in-
state telecasts, regardless of where a boxing event takes place.2 No 
similar tax is levied on other pay-per-view events,3 likely because 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; Sc.B. Brown University, 2001. I 
would like to thank my family, Arlene Stein, Jeffrey Stein, Jonathan Stein, 
Mollie Stein and Amy Stein, for their constant love and support. I would also 
like to thank all those who helped me during the writing process, especially 
Victoria Baumfield. Finally, special thanks to Sean Griffin for helping me get 
this note done “by will or by force,” and to Minh Tu Nguyen for being my muse 
and all-around inspiration. 
1 JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 8 (1995) 
2 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2004) (promoters must pay 5% 
tax on gross receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts); MO. REV. STAT. § 
317.006 (2004) (promoters must pay 5% tax on gross receipts of in-state pay-
per-view telecasts); 5 PA. CONS. STAT. § 916 (2004) (promoters must pay 3% 
tax on gross receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts). State boxing 
commissions may implement and administer these boxing programming taxes 
via rule-making authority. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (“The Florida State Boxing 
Commission is created and is assigned to the Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation for administrative and fiscal accountability purposes.”). 
3 The statutory schemes in Florida, Pennsylvania and Missouri, for 
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few pay-per-view programs generate as much revenue as boxing.4 
Selectively taxing one type of pay-per-view program but no others 
ought to be treated as a content-based violation of promoters’ First 
Amendment rights. However, neither boxing, nor other sports, 
have enjoyed first amendment protections. In a recent case, Top 
Rank v. Florida State Boxing Commission, a Florida court 
dismissed a First Amendment challenge to the special pay-per-
view tax on boxing and held that boxing is not a form of 
                                                          
example, have specific provisions for taxing pay-per-view boxing and wrestling, 
yet none of these states have a similar provision taxing any other type of pay-
per-view event. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06; MO. REV. STAT. § 317.006; 5 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 916. However, boxing and wrestling are not the only live events 
televised by pay-per-view—for instance, these states do not tax live telecasts of 
pay-per-view concerts. 
4 For example, the HBO pay-per-view broadcast of the Oscar De La Hoya-
Bernard Hopkins middleweight-championship bout on September 18, 2004 
generated $56 million in revenue (at $54.95 per buy). R. Thomas Umstead, Not 
Golden, But Lucrative, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 27, 2004, at 3 [herinafter 
Umstead, Not Golden]. Heavyweight championships generate even more 
substantial revenues: the Mike Tyson-Lennox Lewis bout garnered a record 1.8 
million buys and $106.8 million in revenue. R. Thomas Umstead, Events 
Struggle to Recapture Past Glory; Slumps for Boxing, Wrestling and Lack of 
Marquee Events Spur a Falloff, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 3, 2004, at 90 
[hereinafter Umstead, Events Struggle]. 
 Moreover, pay-per-view boxing’s earning potential is enhanced by the 
quantity of telecasts broadcast each month. According to Time Warner Cable of 
New York City’s website, there will be at least four nationally distributed pay-
per-view boxing telecasts in April 2006, ranging in price from $19.95-$44.95 
per buy. Time Warner Cable of New York City, April 2006 Events, (April 26, 
2006), available at http://www2.twcnyc.com/index2. cfm?c=ppv/events_re. 
During the same month, there are two annual bodybuilding competitions (at 
$19.95 and $29.95 per buy), one English Premier League Soccer season package 
(at $19.95 per buy), , and one concert event (at $19.95 per buy). 
 In contrast, live concert pay-per-view broadcasts are significantly less 
profitable. See Umstead, Not Golden, supra, at 3. According to Ken Hershman, 
Senior Vice President and General Manager of Showtime Sports and Event 
Programming, “performers themselves have become disenchanted with the 
PPV-event category and would rather get a fee than assume the risks tied to buy-
rate performance.” Id. Faced with comparatively unfavorable economics, “the 
[entertainment] industry has forced events like Britney [Spears] from what 
would normally be PPV to Showtime.” Id. 
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expression protected by the First Amendment.5 
The Top Rank court relied on judicial opinions holding that 
sports, such as college football and professional figure skating, are 
not expressive conduct.6 The cases cited in Top Rank should not 
stand for the blanket proposition that all sports are merely physical 
activities.7 Instead, they can be better read as case-specific 
analyses applying First Amendment speech doctrines to physical 
conduct.8 In Spence v. Washington,9 the Supreme Court 
emphasized two factors in determining whether conduct was 
sufficiently communicative to constitute speech under the First 
                                                          
5 837 So. 2d 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
1045 (2004). 
6 Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 498. The court summarily stated: 
We recognize that athletic events provide people with a great deal 
of entertainment. We, however, agree with the views expressed in 
the previously cited cases that most athletic events do not convey 
any message, symbolic or otherwise . . . . Thus, the regulated 
activity in this case is clearly distinguishable from [a statute 
imposing a financial burden on the speaker because of the content 
of his speech]. 
Id. at 502 (emphasis added). 
7 Id. at 502. In a footnote, Judge Wolf opined, “I am in fact an enthusiastic 
sports fan, but I do not believe we should dilute the significance of First 
Amendment protection by making it applicable to all athletic endeavors.” Id. at 
502 n.1 (emphasis added). This footnote, coupled with the court’s prior 
language, “most athletic events do not convey any message, symbolic or 
otherwise,” Id. at 502 (emphasis added), precludes a reading of the case that 
would support the blanket proposition that all athletic events do not convey any 
message, symbolic or otherwise. 
8 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974). The relevant inquiry in First Amendment cases 
involving expressive conduct is the subjective intent of the speaker in question 
and the objective likelihood that his listeners will comprehend his message. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. The language in these cases 
clearly indicates that the analysis should be applied to the conduct in question, 
and makes no reference to similar conduct. However, as explained infra, the Top 
Rank court appeared to incorporate “guilt by association” into its First 
Amendment analysis, seemingly holding that if other sports could not be 
categorized as expressive conduct under the First Amendment, neither should 
boxing. 
9 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
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Amendment: the intent to convey a “particularized message” and, 
given the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed it.10 Since time 
immemorial, fighting has been a form of expression,11 and the 
sport of boxing is merely a legal fight sanctioned by the state.12 
Further, in the sport of boxing, each fight conveys its own 
particular message.13 For example, Joe Louis, a black fighter, 
defeated German Heavyweight Max Schmeling in 1938 and single-
handedly debunked the Nazi propaganda machine in front of the 
world.14 Boxing deserves the First Amendment protections that 
have been granted to other physical, yet expressive, conduct.15 
However, whether boxing receives full or partial protection under 
the First Amendment, pay-per-view boxing programming taxes are 
content-based regulations subject to strict scrutiny because they 
single out boxing, while no other pay-per-view events are similarly 
taxed.16 
This Note critiques the holding in Top Rank v. Florida State 
                                                          
10 Id. at 410-11. 
11 See MICHAEL B. POLIAKOFF, COMBAT SPORTS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD: 
COMPETITION, VIOLENCE, AND CULTURE 113-115 (1995) (discussing how, inter 
alia, boxers in ancient societies expressed their status as heroes and benefactors 
to society by engaging in their sport.) 
12 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.008 decrees that professional or 
amateur fights which do not meet the requirements set forth by either Chapter 
548 of the Florida Statutes or promulgated by the Florida State Boxing 
Commission are subject to criminal liability. Fighters are subject to criminal 
penalties. 
13 See, e.g., Norman Mailer, King of the Hill, in JOYCE CAROL OATES & 
DANIEL HALPERN, READING THE FIGHTS 124 (1988). 
14 See generally CHRIS MEAD, CHAMPION: JOE LOUIS 137-50 (1986). 
15 At the very least, boxing is as expressive as nude dancing, which is 
recognized as “speech.” Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
16 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (utilizing strict scrutiny 
to invalidate discriminatory taxes imposed upon some speakers but not others). 
See also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 112 (1991) (statute inflicting a financial burden on speakers 
because of the content of their speech is “presumptively inconsistent with the 
First Amendment”); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
231 (1987) (content-based speech restrictions are invalid unless narrowly 
tailored to promote a “compelling state interest”). 
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Boxing Commission that boxing events are not subject to the 
protections of the First Amendment, and proposes that boxing can 
pass the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Spence v. 
Washington,17 whereby conduct can be deemed expressive speech. 
Part I examines the Top Rank decision against Supreme Court 
decisions which extend First Amendment protections beyond 
speakers to protect promoters of speech, as well as other decisions 
by courts which have considered similar boxing-specific taxes on 
pay-per-view broadcasts. Part II analyzes the cases which the Top 
Rank court used to support its determination that boxing is mere 
sport which is undeserving of the protections of the First 
Amendment. Lastly, Part III presents an historical and literary 
analysis of boxing in order to demonstrate that boxing satisfies the 
Spence test and is worthy of the protections of the First 
Amendment. 
I. THE TOP RANK DECISION 
Top Rank, Inc. is a Nevada corporation that promotes boxing 
matches and produces pay-per-view cable television boxing 
programs.18 The company is run by International Boxing Hall of 
Fame promoter Bob Arum, whose stable of talent has included 
Muhammad Ali, Roberto Duran, George Foreman, Joe Frazier, 
Larry Holmes, Marvin Hagler, Thomas Hearns, “Sugar” Ray 
Leonard, and Oscar De La Hoya.19 Arum has participated in most 
of the top-grossing fights in boxing history such as Hagler-
Leonard, Chavez-De La Hoya, Holyfield-Foreman, Ali-Frazier II 
and both Ali-Spinks fights.20 
The controversy in Top Rank revolved around several matches 
promoted by Top Rank, held outside the state of Florida, and 
subject to taxation in Florida under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 and 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61K1-1.042. Florida’s Joe Lang 
                                                          
17 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974). 
18 Top Rank v. Florida State Boxing Commission, 837 So. 2d 496, 497-98 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1045 (2004). 
19 Top Rank, Inc., A Look @ Bob Arum, http://www.toprank. 
com/Bob.htm. 
20 Id. 
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Kershaw Act regulates the sports of professional boxing and 
kickboxing within the state of Florida.21 The relevant portion of the 
Kershaw Act requires that boxing promoters22 pay a tax of five 
percent on the “gross receipts”23 derived from boxing matches.24 
The Act empowers the Florida State Boxing Commission to 
promulgate and enforce implementing regulations.25 Specifically, 
Rule 61K1-1.042 requires promoters to pay a five percent tax on 
each telecast of a pay-per-view boxing event ordered by a Florida 
subscriber. The rule applies to all matches “viewed within Florida, 
whether originating in Florida or not.”26 
In 2000, Top Rank challenged the portions of the Act that 
imposed taxes on pay-per-view boxing events featuring matches 
held outside the state of Florida.27 Because the tax applies only to 
boxing programming, Top Rank alleged that it was a content-based 
restriction on speech violative of the First Amendment.28 Top Rank 
sought a refund of taxes already paid, as well as an injunction 
against the imposition of further taxes under the Florida statute and 
implementing regulations.29 The trial court granted the Florida 
Boxing Commission’s motion for summary judgment, finding 
§548.06 facially valid.30 
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal for Florida upheld the 
trial court’s ruling, holding that a boxing match is not pure nor 
symbolic speech, thus declining to extend First Amendment 
                                                          
21 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 548.001-.079 (2004). 
22 The Act defines “promoter” as “any person. . .who produces, arranges, or 
stages any match involving a professional.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.02(19). 
23 The Kershaw Act defines taxable “gross receipts” to include income 
from ticket sales, concessions and the “gross price charged for the sale or lease 
of broadcasting, television, and motion picture rights.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
548.06(1)(a)-(c). 
24 Id. at § 548.06. 
25 FLA. STAT. ANN. at § 548.003; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61K-1.001, et 
seq. (2004). 
26 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61K1-1.042(4). 
27 Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 497-99. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 498. 
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protection to the promoters of a boxing match.31 The Court framed 
this issue as “whether boxing, an athletic event where the 
participants are attempting to win prize money, is a form of 
conduct containing elements of communication or involving pure 
speech or symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment.”32 
The court opined that “[I]n its most basic form, athletic 
competition does not constitute pure speech; rather, participation in 
athletic competition constitutes physical activity or conduct.”33 
Analogizing boxing to professional wrestling, college football and 
surfing, the court concluded that “most athletic events do not 
convey any message, symbolic or otherwise,” that would allow for 
protection under the First Amendment.34 The court did not take 
into account any differences between boxing and the 
aforementioned sports, but instead relied on “guilt by 
association”—since courts have held that other sports are mere 
conduct, the Top Rank court simply concluded that boxing matches 
must be mere conduct as well.35 Judge Wolf (who is not an expert 
on the sport of boxing) found that the only message conveyed by a 
boxing match is each fighter’s attempt to win prize money.36 As 
such, boxing is not sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to warrant First Amendment protection.37 
A. Boxing Promoters are Members of the Media 
Florida’s tax on pay-per-view boxing telecasts runs afoul of the 
First Amendment, irrespective of whether the sport of boxing itself 
is speech because boxing promoters are members of the media. 
Taxation discriminating against members of the media implicates 
the First Amendment regardless of the content of the underlying 
speech, but the Top Rank court held that Top Rank was not a 
                                                          
31 Id. 
32 Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 500 (emphasis added). 
33 Id. (citing Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (declining 
to extend First Amendment protection to college football)). 
34 Id. at 502 (internal citations omitted). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 500-02. 
37 Id. 
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“member of the media” and therefore the First Amendment did not 
apply.38 
On the issue of Top Rank’s status as a First Amendment 
speaker, the District Court of Appeal found that since boxing 
promoters were not commonly regarded as members of the media, 
they were too far removed from the actual speech in question to be 
considered a medium of communication.39 The trial court drew a 
distinction between Top Rank as promoter and Showtime, the 
television broadcaster of the pay-per-view event at issue.40 Top 
Rank is a licensed boxing promoter responsible for “[arranging] 
live professional boxing events.”41 These events are in turn made 
available to consumers on a pay-per-view basis through licensing 
agreements with various distributors or broadcasters.42 Top Rank is 
the sine qua non of the entire event. Regardless of whether Top 
Rank is characterized as a member of the media, the government’s 
power to impose content-based taxes on speech should not vary 
based on the speaker’s identity.43 Indeed, any entity contracting 
with a First Amendment speaker to transmit his speech becomes 
part of the medium of communication.44 
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., the Supreme Court struck down New York’s “Son-of-
                                                          
38 Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 500. 
39 Id. at 498. 
40 Id. 
Showtime claimed that it could be considered a promoter under 
Florida law and thus potentially liable for the tax; it joined Top 
Rank and America Presents in filing a complaint in which the three 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations that the 
statute imposing the tax is unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss Showtime 
on the basis that Showtime lacked standing since it had not yet been 
assessed the boxing tax.  
Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 117 (1991). 
44 Id. 
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Sam” law45 as content-based restriction on the dissemination of 
speech by the media.46 New York’s Son-of-Sam Law required that 
an accused or convicted criminal’s income from works describing 
his crime be deposited in an escrow account; these funds were used 
to reimburse crime victims for the harm they had suffered.47 Simon 
& Schuster involved the contract that led to Nicholas Pileggi’s 
book Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family, which eventually became 
Martin Scorsese’s hit mob film “Goodfellas.” 48 In August 1981, 
admitted organized crime figure Henry Hill entered into a contract 
with author Nicholas Pileggi for the production of a book about 
Hill’s life. Subsequently, publisher Simon & Schuster entered into 
a publishing agreement under which Simon & Schuster agreed to 
make payments to both Hill and Pileggi.49 The collaboration 
between Hill and Pileggi resulted in Wiseguy, a first-person 
narrative in which Hill “depicts in colorful detail, the day-to-day 
existence of organized crime.”50 “Throughout Wiseguy, Hill 
frankly admits to having participated in an astonishing variety of 
crimes.”51 
On May 21, 1987, the New York State Victim’s Crime Board 
ordered Simon & Schuster to suspend all payments to Hill pursuant 
                                                          
45 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 and Supp. 1991). The “Son-
of-Sam” law gained its name from serial killer David Berkowitz, a/k/a the “Son 
of Sam.” Between 1976 and 1977, Berkowitz went on a killing spree around the 
city of New York that left seven dead and six others injured. 
Firstamendmentcenter.org, “Son-of-Sam” Laws, Oct. 31, 2005, 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Speech/arts/topic.aspx?topic=son_of_sam
. Berkowitz’s “Son of Sam” moniker came from his claim that a ghost named 
Sam spoke to him through his neighbor’s dog and ordered him to kill his 
victims. Id. After Berkowitz pled guilty and was sentenced to 365 years in jail, 
he was offered “substantial sums of money” for the rights to his story. Id. In 
response to this, the New York Legislature passed N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a to 
prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes, and to recompense the 
victims. Id. 
46 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118-21. 
47 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a. 
48 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 112-15. 
49 Id. at 112. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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to the “Son-of-Sam” law: 
The Board determined that Wiseguy was covered by N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 632-a, that Simon & Schuster had violated 
the law by failing to turn over its contract with Hill to the 
Board and by making payments to Hill, and that all money 
owed to Hill under the contract had to be turned over to the 
Board to be held in escrow for the victims of Hill’s crimes. 
The Board ordered Hill to turn over the payments he had 
already received, and ordered Simon & Schuster to turn 
over all money payable to Hill at the time or in the future.52 
As a threshold matter, the Court found that the “Son-of-Sam” 
law was a content-based restriction and therefore subject to strict 
scrutiny. The law “single[d] out income derived from expressive 
activity for a burden the State place[d] on no other income, and it 
[was] directed only at works with a specified content,” i.e., 
crime.53 Since a statute that imposes a financial burden on speakers 
because of the content of their speech “is presumptively 
inconsistent with the First Amendment,” the Court held that the 
statute was subject to strict scrutiny.54 It was of no import to the 
Court whether the First Amendment speaker was Henry Hill, who 
was taxed “because of the story he has told,” or Simon & Schuster, 
which published books as a result of those stories. The tax at issue 
operated as a “disincentive to speak,” with respect to the content of 
the speech, not the identity of the speaker. 55 
Even if Henry Hill, not Simon & Schuster, was the “speaker,” 
the tax was still a content-based restriction of the “media.”56 The 
Court dismissed the Board’s argument that even if the First 
Amendment prohibits content-based financial regulation the 
media, the Son-of-Sam law was different, since it imposed “a 
general burden on any ‘entity’ contracting with a convicted person 
to transmit that person’s speech.57 The Court, however, held that 
whether the actor is characterized as a “member of the media” is 
                                                          
52 Id. at 114-15. 
53 Id. at 115-16. 
54 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115-16. 
55 Id. at 116-17. 
56 Id. at 117. 
57 Id. at 117. 
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irrelevant, for “[t]he government’s power to impose content-based 
financial disincentives on speech surely does not vary with the 
identity of the speaker.”58 Indeed, prior to its decision in Simon & 
Schuster, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to content-
based regulation of cable broadcasts in Leathers v. Medlock.59 
B. Content-Based Taxation Warrants Strict Scrutiny 
Even if the sport of boxing itself did not fall within the ambit 
of protected speech under the First Amendment, the Kershaw Act 
still ought to be subject to strict scrutiny. “A tax on the 
dissemination of entertainment based on content must pass strict 
scrutiny, regardless of its subject matter.”60 Content-based speech 
restrictions are thus subject to strict scrutiny, and they are invalid 
unless “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and 
“narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”61 The Supreme Court has 
applied this principle to taxes on speech, utilizing strict scrutiny to 
invalidate discriminatory taxes imposed upon some speakers but 
not others.62 Laws burdening speech “must satisfy the same 
rigorous scrutiny” as laws “banning speech.”63 
Denying Top Rank the status of speaker in the Florida case, 
deprived the promoter of the benefit of strict scrutiny of the 
Kershaw Act. The Florida regulation does not apply a general tax 
to all pay-per-view events. Instead, Florida’s Kershaw Act singles 
out pay-per-view boxing for taxation.64 There is no other Florida 
                                                          
58 Id. 
59 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991). 
60 United States Satellite Broad. Co. v. Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 
(D. Cal. 1999) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)). 
61 Arkansas Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 231. 
62 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991). 
63 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 
(2000). 
64 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06. Presently, there is no information as to 
whether the Florida Boxing Commission has enforced the pay-per-view tax as to 
telecasts of other pugilistic exhibitions as set forth in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.002 
(kickboxing and mixed martial arts). 
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statute taxing any other type of pay-per-view telecast, even though 
there is a multitude of pay-per-view events besides boxing.65 
Accordingly, the tax should be subject to strict scrutiny and should 
have been invalidated unless Florida could show that it is narrowly 
tailored to promote a compelling state interest. Florida’s tax on 
boxing telecasts cannot meet this burden. In enacting the Kershaw 
Act, neither the Florida legislature nor the Florida State Boxing 
                                                          
65 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (promoters must pay 5% tax on 
gross receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
548.002(19) (defining “promoter” as “any person . . . who produces, arranges, or 
stages any match involving a professional”), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.12 
(levies a tax upon “every person who engages in the business of selling 
communications services at retail in [the state of Florida]”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
202.19 (“The governing authority of each county and municipality [in Florida] 
may, by ordinance, levy a discretionary communications services tax); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (3) (defines “communications services” as any point-to-
point “transmission, conveyance, or routing of . . . cable services by any 
conceivable means) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.11(2) (defines “cable service” 
as “the transmission of video, audio, or other programming service to 
purchasers, and the purchaser interaction, if any, required for the selection or use 
of any such programming service . . . including . . . pay-per-view [services]). 
 The only other Florida statute to address the concept of pay-per-view is the 
Communications Services Tax Simplification Law (FLA. STAT. ANN. § § 202.10, 
et seq.) [hereinafter CS Tax]. In contrast to the Kershaw Act, the CS Tax does 
not single out any type of service or provider. Conversely, the CS Tax casts a 
broad net, taxing nearly every means and provider of audio, video data, and 
other types of information or signals. In fact, the CS Tax’s drafters appeared to 
have gone to great lengths to do so, viz., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (delineating 
the CS Tax’s scope in broad terms with very narrow exceptions). For example, 
in defining “cable service,” the framers purported to cover every link in the 
information supply chain. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (2). Moreover, the 
framers intended for the CS Act’s scope to remain broad in the future, viz., FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 202.11 (3) (defines means or method of “transmission, 
conveyance, or routing of voice, data, audio, video, or any other information or 
signals” to encompass both any medium or method “now in existence or 
hereafter devised, regardless of the protocol used for such transmission or 
conveyance”). 
 On the other hand, the Kershaw Act pertains exclusively to the taxation of 
boxing. Unlike the CS Tax, which covers to every means, method and provider 
within its broad jurisdiction (communications), the Kershaw Act is simply a 
device to tax all revenue streams to flowing through its narrow jurisdiction 
(pugilistic exhibitions). See also supra note 4. 
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Commission included findings to support the proposition that the 
tax on boxing programming furthers a legitimate state interest. The 
generation of tax revenue is not a sufficient justification for a 
content-based speech restriction.66 Since Florida’s content-based 
burden on speech lacks a compelling interest in the taxation of 
pay-per-view boxing programming, the tax is unconstitutional. The 
Top Rank court erred in upholding the tax, and Top Rank should 
have prevailed. 
Florida’s isolation of boxing for special tax treatment is 
equivalent to an Oregon boxing tax held to be a content-based 
restriction in TVKO v. Howland,67 as well as a California boxing 
tax that the court refused to enforce in United States Satellite 
Broad. Co. v. Lynch.68 “[I]f no [boxing] match is shown, no tax is 
imposed.”69 Thus, like the taxes in TVKO and U.S. Satellite, the 
Kershaw Act constitutes a content-based restriction on speech.70 
1. United States Satellite Broad. Co. v. Lynch 
In United States Satellite Broad. Co. v. Lynch, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of California struck down a 
California statute71 imposing a five percent gross receipts tax 
exclusively on telecasts of boxing and other combat sports, 
because it inflicted an unjustified financial burden on the speaker.72 
The controversy in that case centered on U.S. Satellite’s refusal to 
pay the tax following the live pay-per-view broadcast of the 
                                                          
66 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. at 585 (1983). 
67 15 Or. Tax 335 (2001), aff’d, 335 Or. 527 (2003). 
68 United States Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113 
(E.D. Cal. 1999). 
69 TVKO, 15 Or. Tax at 345. 
70 Although the TVKO and U.S. Satellite cases deal with taxes levied on 
broadcasters of pay-per-view boxing, rather than on promoters of the telecast, 
the analysis as to whether such regulations are facially content-based is the same 
because in each case, assuming that boxing is expressive conduct, the laws in 
question deal with the telecast of speech protected under the First Amendment. 
71 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18600 et seq. (1999). 
72 U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-22. 
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infamous fight between Evander Holyfield and Mike Tyson on 
June 28, 1997.73 The fight took place in Nevada; U.S. Satellite’s 
only contact with the state of California in the matter arose from its 
sale of telecasts within the state.74 
The U.S. Satellite court held that a tax on the dissemination of 
entertainment based on content must pass First Amendment strict 
scrutiny, regardless of its subject matter.75 It observed that it does 
not matter whether the First Amendment protects or even applies 
to boxing.76 Rejecting the defendants’ argument that pay-per-view 
boxing telecasts should not enjoy First Amendment protection 
because “boxing is somehow ‘less valuable’ than other subjects,” 
the court stated: 
The First Amendment does not protect murder, yet the 
court feels confident that news broadcasts of murder, 
killing, or war may not be censored to suppress their 
content. Nor is a hurricane protected by the First 
Amendment; yet a broadcaster with an audience has a right 
under the First Amendment to broadcast images of a 
hurricane.77 
To hold otherwise would “[run] contrary to every principle of 
the Free Speech Clause itself.”78 Thus, taxing a pay-per-view 
broadcast based on its content must pass strict scrutiny, regardless 
of its underlying subject matter.79 
The court further held that such a tax did not advance a 
compelling state interest, and even if it had, it was not narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest.80 The court dismissed California’s 
general interest in raising revenue as insufficient to justify a 
content-based tax on speech, opining that “while speech may be 
taxed to help pay for the costs created by the speech itself . . . the 
                                                          
73 This was the fight where referee Mills Lane disqualified Mike Tyson 
because he bit off Evander Holyfield’s ear. 
74 U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
75 Id. at 1121. 
76 U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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state may not merely use supposed ‘administrative costs’ as a guise 
for raising revenue.”81 One of the “administrative costs” claimed 
by California was “its efforts to keep boxing clean.”82 The court 
was unconvinced that this was a compelling interest because the 
California Boxing Commission did not mention the yearly cost of 
“keeping boxing clean.”83 Thus, even if the court concluded that 
the state had raised compelling interests, it could not conclude that 
the tax in question was narrowly tailored to serve them.84 The 
Commission also “[presented] no evidence or argument 
whatsoever on the amount of the costs, if any, incurred to the 
Commission by plaintiff’s telecasts into private homes of boxing 
matches which occur in another state.”85 Furthermore, the court 
noted that the Commission deposited tax revenues in the state 
general fund, and “did not directly spend all of the revenues raised 
by the tax.”86 
The U.S. Satellite court held that the imposition of the tax on 
tickets sold to live boxing events held in California did not justify 
extending that tax to pay-per-view broadcasts of boxing events 
regardless of whether they were held in California.87 The court 
found that the state’s argument that the tax prevented promoters 
from evading the live events tax by moving their matches out of 
state “simply [devolved] to the [general] interest in raising 
revenue, which [did] not justify a content-specific tax.”88 The court 
likewise rejected the contention that the tax served as an equalizer 
“to avoid disadvantaging promoters of live matches in California.” 
89 The court opined that promoters of live boxing matches in 
California would be better served via a tax structure that “made no 
reference to the content of the telecast.”90 
                                                          
81 U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-22. 
82 Id. at 1122. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23. 
88 Id. at 1123. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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2. TVKO v. Howland 
More recently, in TVKO v. Howland, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon also held that taxing television transmissions of boxing 
matches held out of state is repugnant to the First Amendment.91 In 
that case, an Oregon statute would have required the distributor of 
a pay-per-view boxing match that took place in New York City to 
pay a 6% tax on gross receipts earned on the broadcast within the 
state of Oregon.92 The TVKO court noted that the tax in question 
was only imposed upon the telecasts or transmissions of boxing 
matches; simply put, “[I]f no [boxing] match is shown, no tax is 
imposed.”93 Since the tax was content-based, it was subject to strict 
scrutiny.94 
Subsequently, the court refused to find any of Oregon’s 
proffered interests in the tax sufficiently compelling to justify its 
disparate treatment of boxing.95 Oregon has a legitimate interest in 
regulating boxing matches in that state.96 Indeed, the court noted 
that the state may promulgate “such laws, rules, or regulations as it 
deems necessary or good to protect the public’s health and 
welfare.”97 However, taxing the broadcast of an out-of-state boxing 
match did nothing to further this goal, but was instead a circuitous 
and unjustified attempt to regulate communication.98 
Even if Oregon had a legitimate interest in regulating 
communication, the court held that the tax was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve that end.99 Specifically, the court rejected the 
state’s argument that the tax paid for the industry in which TVKO 
                                                          
91 TVKO v. Howland, 15 Or. Tax 335, 343-45 (2001), aff’d, 335 Or. 527 
(2003). The TVKO court passed on the issue of whether the tax as applied to in-
state telecasts was also unconstitutional. 
92 TVKO, 15 Or. Tax at 337-38. 
93 Id. at 345. 
94 Id. at 344. 
95 Id. at 344-45. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 345. 
98 Id. 
99 TVKO, 15 Or. Tax at 346. 
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did business.100 The court emphasized that TVKO’s only 
connection to Oregon was the broadcast of a boxing match that 
took place outside of Oregon.101 Accordingly, Oregon had no 
jurisdiction to regulate boxing matches held outside the state.102 
II. SPORTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In Top Rank, the District Court of Appeals for Florida not only 
denied Top Rank status as a speaker, but also denied that boxing, 
or any sport, was protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme 
Court has yet to rule on whether sport in general is entitled to First 
Amendment protection. However, the Court has firmly established 
that the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech applies 
to conduct, as well as words. The Court set forth the test for 
determining what conduct constitutes protected speech in Spence v. 
Washington.103 Under the Spence test, conduct constitutes 
protected speech when there exists: (i) an intent to convey a 
specific message, and (ii) a substantial likelihood that the message 
would be understood by those receiving it.104 
Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is 
protected by the First Amendment.105 This protection applies to 
speech “in any medium that either informs or entertains, 
[including] books, motion pictures, radio, television programs, live 
entertainment, poetry, painting, music, dramatic works, comics and 
commercials.”106 Indeed, all ideas having “even the slightest 
redeeming social importance” have full protection under the First 
Amendment.107 Thus, video games,108 live music,109 and even nude 
                                                          
100 Id. 
101 Id at 145-46. 
102 Id. 
103 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
104 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
105 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding 
that live entertainment is speech); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 
U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that broadcast entertainment is speech). 
106 Doe v. TCI Cablevision of Missouri, 30 Media L. Rep. 2409 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
107 Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:36 PM 
1016 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
dancing110 enjoy first Amendment protection. 
The Court stated in Roth v. United States, “the protection given 
speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.”111 All ideas having “even the slightest redeeming 
social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even 
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full 
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they 
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.”112 
Boxing meets this minimum standard of having “even the slightest 
redeeming social importance.” Whether viewed as simply a fight 
divorced from its illegal components, entertainment, or as a contest 
capable of expressing a social or political message,113 the sport of 
boxing is more than mere conduct. 
A. Sports and the Outer Perimeters of Speech 
The Top Rank court relied on cases involving sports, in which 
the deciding courts were reluctant to apply the protections of the 
First Amendment to conduct that does not fall within the 
traditional notions of political and ideological speech.114 Some of 
those cases precede the Supreme Court’s decision in Spence v 
Washington, in which a test was formulated for determining 
whether conduct may be considered expressive speech.115 All of 
the cases relied on by the Top Rank court predate the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of First Amendment protection for promoters 
of speech, as in Simon & Schuster. These examinations of sports 
were all considered prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Barnes 
v. Glen Theatre, Inc. that the First Amendment may protect 
                                                          
108 E.g., Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 
(W.D. Wash. 2004). 
109 E.g., Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2004) 
110 E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
111 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
112 Id. at 484-85. 
113 As did the Schmeling-Lewis fight. 
114 See discussion, Part II.A.5. 
115 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
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expression on “the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”116 
Lastly, the cases relied on by the decision in Top Rank reflect the 
dilution of First Amendment protections which occurs when free 
speech is pled while seeking equitable relief from courts. 
1. Murdock v. City of Jacksonville: Professional Wrestling 
In Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, the United States Court for 
the Middle District of Florida held that professional wrestling was 
not speech.117 In that case, a private wrestling promoter challenged 
a resolution of the Jacksonville City Council granting an exclusive 
lease to a competing wrestling promoter, which effectively 
prohibited him from holding professional wrestling matches in the 
Jacksonville Coliseum.118 In addition to other claims, the promoter 
argued that the exclusive lease on the public venue prevented him 
from “entertaining large crowds for wrestling matches” and thus 
violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment.119 
While the court in Murdock acknowledged that the First 
Amendment applied to symbolic speech, it held that protection 
does not extend to a “purely entertainment pastime” such as 
wrestling or the promotion of a wrestling match for 
entertainment.120 The court noted that the First Amendment was 
meant to protect acts such as speech by a political figure, and 
placed heavy emphasis on its notion that entertainment “is just not 
free speech, akin to free speech, nor a symbolic act.”121 However, 
in subsequent years, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
proposition that the First Amendment does not apply to 
                                                          
116 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991). As stated in 
one of the cases discussed below, “exposition of an athletic exercise is on the 
periphery of protected speech (for the purposes of a balancing of conflicting 
interests), as opposed, for example, to political speech, which is the core of the 
First Amendment protection.” Post Newsweek Stations-Connecticut, v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1981). 
117 361 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Fla. 1973). 
118 Id. at 1085. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1086. 
121 Id. at 1096 (internal quotations omitted). 
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entertainment.122 The holding in Murdock rests on the premise that 
a sporting event should be denied First Amendment protection on 
the ground that it is promoted for the purpose of entertainment,123 
but more recent Supreme Court decisions have held that the scope 
of the First Amendment extends beyond political speech.124 
Intervening change in First Amendment jurisprudence aside, 
the Murdock court had additional reasons to find against the 
promoter. The plaintiff sought an order directing the City of 
Jacksonville “to rent the [Jacksonville Coliseum] to him on any 
open days of the week,”125 relief that the plaintiff should not have 
expected from the court. The court noted that “mandamus will not 
lie to review or control the acts of public officers in respect to 
matters as to which they are vested with discretion.”126 Since “the 
decision of whether to lease City property,” as well as to whom it 
will be leased, rested with the City of Jacksonville, it was a 
discretionary task and not subject to mandamus.127 At most, the 
resolution vested impermissible discretion in Jacksonville city 
officials.128 The resolution at issue neither banned nor inhibited 
professional wrestling matches; it merely determined that only one 
promoter would be permitted to present wrestling matches in the 
Jacksonville Coliseum during the pendency of the lease. 
As in further cases below, the request for inapposite relief in 
Matlock caused the court to find against First Amendment 
protection with respect to conduct on the fringes of expression. 
                                                          
122 E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
123 See Murdock, 361 F. Supp. at 1086. 
124 See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) 
(First Amendment protection extended to live entertainment); Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (First Amendment protection 
extended to broadcast entertainment). 
125 Murdock, 361 F. Supp. at 1096. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. Although “a public official may not be vested with broad discretion 
for determining arbitrarily and without standards in what manner and by whom 
activities protected by the First [Amendment] may be conducted.” Id. (internal 
citation omitted). However, the court did not reach the issue, since it determined 
that wrestling was protected speech. 
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2. Post Newsweek Stations-Connecticut v. Travelers Ins. Co.: 
Figure Skating 
The Top Rank court relied on Post Newsweek Stations-
Connecticut v. Travelers Ins. Co.129 as holding that figure skating 
“[does] not convey any message, symbolic or otherwise” sufficient 
to bring it under the ambit of the First Amendment.130 Post 
Newsweek can better be read as standing for the proposition that 
courts will not allow parties to use the First Amendment to 
circumvent the express terms of a contract negotiated at arms’ 
length. Contract provisions prohibiting a television station from 
broadcasting footage of the 1981 World Figure Skating 
Championships were challenged on First Amendment grounds in 
Post Newsweek. The network holding the exclusive broadcast 
rights required contracting stations to wait until the network had 
completed its broadcast of the event, which was conducted at the 
Hartford Civic Center and operated by the City of Hartford.131 The 
plaintiff television station asserted that the denial of television 
coverage restricted its First Amendment right “to provide 
immediate reporting” of the newsworthy event and sought a 
preliminary injunction to allow it to broadcast despite the 
contractual agreement.132 
The Post Newsweek court did not apply the Spence test to the 
sport of figure skating; rather, the case was analyzed as a 
restriction on the use of a public forum. The court decided the case 
“by weighing the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests 
involved.”133 On the one hand, the court considered the severity of 
the restriction on the plaintiff, which it found did not amount to 
censorship. On the other hand, the court considered the impact on 
the public at large and decided that allowing plaintiff to broadcast 
the World Figure Skating Championships via television would 
severely diminish the commercial value of the event.134 Even 
                                                          
129 510 F. Supp. 81 (D.C. Conn. 1981). 
130 Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 502. 
131 Post, 510 F. Supp at 83-84. 
132 Id. at 84. 
133 Id. at 87. 
134 Id. at 84. The court refused to factor into its calculus the worldwide 
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though the plaintiffs could not broadcast live television coverage, 
“[t]he general public [had] ready access to the event, the event 
[would] be reported by newspaper and radio media without any 
time or manner restriction, and the plaintiff [was allowed] attend 
and report on the [figure skating] championships. . . .”135 
The court held that the “exposition of an athletic exercise is on 
the periphery of protected speech (for the purposes of a balancing 
of conflicting interests), as opposed, for example, to political 
speech, which is the core of the first amendment [sic] 
protection.”136 Noting that figure skating is a “uniquely visual 
sport,” the court decided that a live television broadcast would 
diminish the “commercial value” of the World Figure Skating 
Championships in a way that newspaper or radio coverage would 
not.137 Allowing plaintiffs to cover the event in spite of the 
restriction would amount to a constitutional right of special access 
to the event.138 Such a right would jeopardize revenue resulting 
from comparable entertainment contracts going forward, since 
“similar events would be placed in private arenas where broadcast 
coverage could be more effectively restricted.”139 
3. Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: College 
Football 
In Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,140 
student athletes on the University of Arizona varsity football team 
filed an application for injunctive relief against the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association to prevent enforcement of the 
NCAA’s sanctions which rendered their football team ineligible to 
                                                          
attention that would be focused on the World Figure Skating Championships, 
observing that, “First Amendment guarantees do not fluctuate in response to the 
whims of public approval. The relative popularity of the particular speech at 
issue is not a factor in assessing first amendment protection.” Id. at 87. 
135 Id. at 86. 
136 Post, 510 F. Supp. at 86. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
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participate in post-season competition or to play in a game 
broadcast on national television for two years. Amongst their 
claims, the athletes alleged that the sanctions functioned as an 
“unconstitutional prior restraint of their First Amendment right to 
freedom of expression.”141 
The court’s sole charge in that case was to ensure that the 
sanctions imposed by the NCAA were neither arbitrary nor 
irrational. The Justice court was not permitted to “evaluate the 
relative efficacy of the particular means chosen by the NCAA to 
achieve its objectives.”142 Since the plaintiffs had violated clearly 
defined rules that had clearly delineated consequences, and were 
punished accordingly, the NCAA’s actions were neither arbitrary 
nor capricious. A holding to the contrary would have subverted the 
NCAA’s role as a voluntary athletic association.143 
As in Post Newsweek, the court was asked to recognize 
conduct as capable of being categorized as First Amendment 
speech. The court in Justice, was “unwilling” to grant the plaintiff 
athletes relief from the NCAA’s authority.144 Allowing the 
plaintiffs to invoke the First Amendment to avoid the NCAA 
sanctions would have undermined the NCAA’s disciplinary and 
rulemaking authority.145 The plaintiffs in Justice had a lot to lose 
                                                          
141 Id. at 373. 
142 Id. at 372 (citing Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 
1976)). 
143 Id. 
144 The Justice court uses the term “unwilling” as opposed to using 
“unable.” 577 F. Supp. at 374. The former would denote reluctance to exploit a 
possibility, while the latter would denote impotence do so, regardless of one’s 
desire. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DESK DICTIONARY 2, 634 (1995) (defining “able” 
as “having sufficient power, skill, or resources to accomplish an object” and 
defining “willing” as “inclined or favorably disposed in mind”). 
145 The Justice court described such authority during the pendency of that 
litigation: 
The NCAA is an unincorporated association that regulates a 
substantial part of the nation’s intercollegiate athletics. It is composed 
of approximately 960 four-year colleges and universities located 
throughout the United States. Approximately fifty percent of its 
members are private institutions and fifty percent are funded by the 
federal or state governments. The policies of the NCAA are established 
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but the court was unwilling to use the First Amendment to tip the 
balance of the equities involved. The penalties exacted upon the 
University of Arizona would likely cause substantial hardship on 
its football program’s ability to recruit going forward, and would 
also deprive the university of any revenues that would have been 
realized as a result of any television appearances that would have 
been made but for the punishment. 
With respect to challenging the NCAA sanctions on First 
Amendment grounds, the above “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard seems to only have required the Justice court to have had 
some sort of plausible basis for concluding that the conduct in 
question, football, was not First Amendment speech. Therefore the 
court was in effect charged with deciding whether football was 
rationally capable of being characterized as mere conduct, as 
opposed to speech.146 “In its most basic form,” the Justice court 
observed, “athletic competition does not constitute pure speech; 
                                                          
by its member universities and colleges at annual conventions and are 
carried out by the NCAA Council. The Council is composed of 46 
persons who are elected by the membership at the annual conventions. 
1983-84 NCAA Manual, NCAA Constitution, Article 5, Section 1. The 
University of Arizona is a public institution and at all pertinent times 
has been a member of the NCAA . . . The NCAA publishes annually a 
manual which contains the NCAA constitution, bylaws, executive 
regulations, enforcement procedures, recommended policies, and rules 
of order. The NCAA constitution states in Article 2, Section 2, that “[a] 
basic purpose of the Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics 
as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an 
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of 
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.” The 
constitution also sets forth certain principles for the conduct of 
intercollegiate athletics. 
Id. at 361. 
146 The court’s exact holding was “plaintiffs’ argument that the players 
have been denied a constitutional right to expression through football is 
unfounded,” Id. at 374. This language would seem at first blush to suggest that 
football is not capable of falling under the ambit of the First Amendment. 
However, when read in light of an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, it is 
better read as saying that it was not entirely irrational for a court to find that the 
NCAA’s sanctions did not deny the players a constitutional right to expression 
through football. 
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rather, participation in athletic competition constitutes physical 
activity or conduct.”147 Application of the Spence test led the court 
to conclude that “[i]ntercollegiate football, like other sports, is 
primarily a conduct-oriented activity, and as such it does not 
warrant ‘the same First Amendment protection that other more 
‘communicative’ forms of entertainment have been afforded.’”148 
4. Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Commissioners of the 
City of Los Angeles: Roller Skating 
In Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Commissioners of 
the City of Los Angeles,149 the Supreme Court of California held 
that operating a recreational roller skating rink was not speech 
protected by the First Amendment.150 In Sunset Amusement, the 
owners of the Rollerbowl roller skating rink challenged the Board 
of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles’s denial of a 
renewal permit to operate their rink for two consecutive years.151 
The operators asserted that the denial of the permit infringed upon 
their First Amendment rights because such denial prevented them 
from “amusing” and “entertaining” their patrons.152 
In a decision that predated Spence v. Washington, the court 
observed that “no case has ever held or suggested that simple 
physical activity falls within the ambit of the First Amendment, at 
least in the absence of some element of communicating or 
                                                          
147 Id. 
148 Id. The athletes in Justice also alleged that “the NCAA sanctions 
den[ied] the public at large its right to entertainment. . . .” Id. at 374. The United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona observed that under Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), “a litigant is not permitted to 
assert the rights of third parties unless the regulation at issue constitutes a ‘real 
and substantial’ deterrent to legitimate expression.” Id. at 374-75 (citing Young, 
427 U.S. at 60). The court’s determination that playing college football was not 
a “protectable, legitimate form of expression,” thus precluded the plaintiffs from 
demonstrating that the NCAA sanctions “constituted a ‘real and substantial’ 
deterrent to freedom of expression.” Id. at 375. 
149 101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972). 
150 101 Cal. Rptr. 773-74. 
151 Id. at 770-71. 
152 Id. 
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advancing ideas or beliefs.”153 The court did look for 
communicative elements in rollerskating, seeking some nexus 
between the speaker and potential listeners, as would be the case 
between a performer and his audience.154 Although the court found 
that some rink spectators might be “entertained or amused” by 
skaters’ activities, since patrons primarily used the facilities for 
“physical exercise and personal pleasure,” the element of 
communication between an artist or performer and his audience 
“[was] entirely lacking.”155 The Sunset court found that physical 
activity standing alone was insufficient to constitute 
communication.156 To fall within the protection of the First 
Amendment, the court held, a speaker must purposefully engage in 
conduct aimed at “communicating or advancing ideas or 
beliefs.”157 As the Spence test would subsequently mandate, the 
court looked not to whether the skaters’ actions may have 
conveyed any number of messages to onlookers, but to whether 
that was the purpose of skating.158 
The decision in Sunset Amusement is analogous to later First 
Amendment jurisprudence invoking the “secondary effects 
doctrine,” applied to zoning ordinances affecting adult movie 
theaters.159 Jurisprudence aside, the court decided not to renew 
Rollerbowl’s permit because it presented a substantial public safety 
risk.160 There was substantial evidence at trial that Rollerbowl had 
violated “applicable Los Angeles ordinances requiring the 
                                                          
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Sunset Amusement, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 774. 
156 Id. at 773. 
157 Id. at 774. 
158 The Sunset Amusement case was decided two years before the Supreme 
Court promulgated the Spence test. Had this case been decided under Spence, 
the court would have reached the same result, as the first element of the Spence 
test is subjective intent to communicate. 
159 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) 
(upholding a city ordinance which imposed a moratorium on licensing adult 
movie theaters because the ordinance was “aimed not at the content of the films 
shown at “adult motion picture theatres,” but rather at the secondary effects of 
such theaters on the surrounding community.”). 
160 Id. at 77. 
STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:36 PM 
 PAY-PER-VIEW BOXING TAXATION 1025 
maintenance of off-street parking” and that the parking facilities 
that it did provide “were too inadequate to comport with the 
‘peace, health, safety, convenience . . . and general welfare of the 
public.’”161 
Instead of signifying the blanket proposition that sports in 
general are not First Amendment speech, Sunset Amusement 
simply demonstrates that a court will not recognize a sport as 
speech where doing so under the facts and circumstances of that 
particular case will endanger the “peace, health, safety, 
convenience . . . and general welfare of the public.”162 
5. MacDonald v. Newsome: Surfing 
In MacDonald v. Newsome, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of North Carolina applied a similar rationale to 
find that recreational surfing was not expressive conduct under the 
First Amendment.163 In that case, a surfing enthusiast brought First 
Amendment challenge to a county ordinance prohibiting 
surfboarding in specified coastal waters. As in Sunset Amusement, 
the MacDonald court focused on the plaintiff’s lack of intent to 
communicate. The court held that as one surfs along the prohibited 
coastal area he neither “protects [the coast] or endeavors to make a 
public declaration or statement.”164 Unlike protesters sleeping in a 
public park overnight in an effort to further public protest,165 or 
wearing an arm band at a public school to protest the Vietnam 
War,166 “surfing is more of an avocation or sport,” and as such 
does not warrant First Amendment protection.167 
                                                          
161 Id. at 77-78. 
162 Id. 
163 437 F. Supp. 796 (E.D.N.C. 1977). 
164 437 F. Supp. at 798. 
165 See United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 984 (D.D.C. 1976). 
166 See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 
(1969). 
167 MacDonald, 437 F. Supp. at 797-98. The irony in the MacDonald 
court’s holding is that most top surfing competitions include an unscored 
component “expression session” where the surfers are out on the water solely to 
have fun and express themselves through their surfing. 
STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:36 PM 
1026 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Similar also to Sunset Amusement, what swayed the court in 
MacDonald was its concern for public safety: 
[P]art of the attraction of surfing is the speed the surfer 
achieves when maneuvering his board across the face of a 
wave. Given the fact that bathers and surfers tend to 
congregate in the same area, the speed the surfer reaches 
coupled with the unpredictability of ocean waves, poses a 
risk of injury to both surfers and swimmers. Furthermore, it 
is conceivable that when a surfer stations himself near a 
pier waiting for a wave or when riding a wave in that 
direction, he may be struck by an errant fishing lure cast by 
an angler standing on a pier.168 
Thus, MacDonald reinforces the proposition that a court will not 
grant full First Amendment protection to a sport where doing so 
would jeopardize public safety. This is consistent with both the 
“secondary effects doctrine,”169 as well as the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of “the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”170 
B. Boxing as First Amendment Protected Expression 
There are only two boxing cases involving the application of 
the First Amendment, and the decisions in those cases have 
differing results. In the first case, United States Satellite 
Broadcasting Co. v. Lynch,171 the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of California suggested that any participant in 
                                                          
168 Id. at 800. 
169 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) 
(upholding a city ordinance which imposed a moratorium on licensing adult 
movie theaters because the ordinance was “aimed not at the content of the films 
shown at “adult motion picture theatres,” but rather at the secondary effects of 
such theaters on the surrounding community”). 
170 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991). As stated in 
one of the cases discussed below, “exposition of an athletic exercise is on the 
periphery of protected speech (for the purposes of a balancing of conflicting 
interests), as opposed, for example, to political speech, which is the core of the 
First Amendment protection.” Post Newsweek Stations-Connecticut, v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1981). 
171 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (E.D. Cal.1999) (any participant in the broadcast or 
promotion of a boxing event is a speaker for First Amendment purposes). 
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the broadcast or promotion of a boxing event is a speaker for First 
Amendment purposes.172 Similar to Top Rank, the plaintiff in U.S. 
Satellite brought suit seeking a declaration that the California 
Boxing Act, which levied a 5% tax on receipts from pay-per-view 
boxing and wrestling, was unconstitutional.173 The U.S. Satellite 
court ultimately struck down the California Boxing Act because of 
the Act’s disparate treatment of combat sports vis-à-vis other pay-
per-view telecasts.174 Although the court rested its holding on the 
fact that that the speaker in that case was a broadcaster and that the 
speech being taxed was a television broadcast, the court noted in 
dicta that First Amendment protection also attaches to boxing 
matches.175 
Chief Judge Shubb stated, “defendants have not convinced the 
court that First Amendment protection does not attach to a live 
boxing match organized, held, and televised for the purpose of 
entertaining live and remote viewers.”176 The court emphasized 
that the First Amendment protects live entertainment, as well as 
political and ideological speech.177 Thus, “a general law that 
                                                          
172 Id. at 1120-21. 
173 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18600 et seq. (2004). The California Boxing 
Act provided that: 
Every person who charges and receives a fee for exhibiting a 
simultaneous telecast of any live, current, or spontaneous contest or 
wrestling exhibition on a closed-circuit telecast viewed within this state 
shall . . . pay to the commission a 5 percent tax, exclusive of federal 
taxes thereon, of the amount paid for admission or subscription telecast, 
as defined in Section 18830, to the showing or viewing of the contest or 
wrestling exhibition. 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18832. 
174 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-22. 
175 Id. at 1120-21. The court stated: 
As a threshold matter, defendants have not convinced the court that 
First Amendment protection does not attach to a live boxing match 
organized, held, and televised for the purpose of entertaining live and 
remote viewers. The First Amendment protects entertainment. It 
protects live entertainment, including even the expressive content of 
nude dancing. 
Id. at 1120 (internal citations omitted). 
176 Id. at 1120. 
177 Id. 
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impacts conduct with expressive and non-expressive elements 
must be ‘within the constitutional power of the government,’ and 
in furtherance of ‘an important or substantial governmental interest 
[that] is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.’”178 
Yet singling out a boxing telecast for disparate tax treatment is 
not the “application of a general law, such as a ban on public 
nudity, on the burning of draft cards, or on physical combat, to 
conduct with both expressive and non-expressive elements.”179 
Instead, since First Amendment protection attaches to the 
dissemination of live entertainment, the court found that the tax 
would impermissibly regulate expressive conduct.180 The court, 
however, declined to formally address whether the sport of boxing 
itself could garner First Amendment protection.181 Therefore, if the 
plaintiff had not been a broadcaster, it is unclear whether the U.S. 
Satellite court would have reached the same conclusion. Further, 
even if it did, the question would still remain as to whether tax was 
                                                          
178 Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). O’Brien 
involved a challenge to a statute prohibiting the “knowing destruction” of one’s 
draft card. In that case, defendant was convicted for publicly burning his draft 
card in protest of the Vietnam War. Although defendant’s actions qualified as 
speech under the First Amendment, The Court held that a sufficient 
governmental interest justified the conviction because of the government’s 
substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective 
Service certificates, since the statute condemned only the independent non-
communicative impact of conduct within its reach, and because the non-
communicative impact of defendant’s act frustrated the government’s interest. 
Id. at 376-91. 
Likewise, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court applied the same analysis to 
nude dancing. Barnes, 501 U.S. 560. Although nude dancing was expressive 
conduct under the First Amendment, the Court held that an Indiana statute 
requiring nude dancers to wear pasties and G-strings did not violate the First 
Amendment since prevention of public nudity was a sufficiently important 
government interest to justify regulating the non-speech element of the 
expressive conduct. See Barnes, 501 U.S. 567-72. 
179 U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. 
180 Id. at 1120-21. 
181 Id. The court observed, that “it simply does not matter in the instant case 
whether the First Amendment protects or even applies to boxing,” since “[a] tax 
on the dissemination of entertainment based on content must pass strict scrutiny, 
regardless of its subject matter.” Id. at 1121 (internal citation omitted). 
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unconstitutional because it was a content-based regulation of either 
the boxing match itself, or of the dissemination of live 
entertainment. 
On the other hand, the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York in Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton refused to extend 
First Amendment protection to boxing.182 Fighting Finest, Inc. 
(FFI) was a nonprofit organization established to organize and 
operate an amateur boxing team composed of New York City 
police officers.183 Initially, FFI was permitted to post notices of 
upcoming events on New York Police Department (NYPD) 
premises.184 Subsequently, New York City Police Commissioners 
Kelly and Bratton denied FFI this right and instead granted the 
same right to another boxing team composed of police officers, 
which was affiliated with the Patrolman’s Benevolent Association 
(PBA), the New York City police officers’ collective bargaining 
agent.185 FFI brought suit against the New York City Police 
Commissioner Bratton, alleging that its denial of access to the 
NYPD’s internal communication system “[interfered] with [its] 
First Amendment right to participate in the social, athletic and 
charitable activities of FFI, all of which, they [claimed, were] 
forms of expressive speech.”186 
The court in that case rejected the argument that New York 
City police officers’ participation in the sport of amateur boxing 
subjectively and objectively conveys “the particularized 
message . . . that police officers are individuals of character 
pursuing excellence and adhering to ethical standards of fair play 
and sportsmanship.”187 The court purported to base its decision on 
the notion that taken to its logical conclusion, “[a] limitless variety 
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging 
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”188 Applying the 
                                                          
182 898 F. Supp. 192, 195-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
183 Id. at 193. 
184 Id. at 194. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 195. 
187 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
188 Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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Spence test, the court held that although dance, when combined 
with nudity, can “inexorably convey a message of eroticism,”189 a 
boxing match in which police officers participate “inexorably 
conveys any message other than that police officers can be 
pugilists.”190 
Despite this observation, the court did not reason that this 
message does not warrant First Amendment protection.191 The 
court did not differentiate between nude dancing and police 
participation in amateur boxing or justify why a message of 
eroticism is protected but not a message of pugilism. 
As in other cases considering sports, the Fighting Finest court 
looked beyond the original two prongs of the Spence test in 
reaching its conclusion. The subtext of FFI’s complaint was that 
Commissioners Kelly and Bratton “sought to curry favor with [the 
PBA’s financial secretary] . . . and withdrew recognition and 
support from FFI in an order to maintain good labor relations.”192 
Observing that such politicking was “hardly pure or pristine,” the 
court found that it was nonetheless rational.193 
As collective bargaining agent of New York City police 
officers, the PBA is an entity that is “integral to the smooth 
running of the NYPD.”194 As such, the court found that Bratton’s 
and Kelly’s efforts on behalf of the NYPD to maintain good 
relations with the PBA were neither irrational nor unreasonable, 
“even if they [did] entail acceding to the arguably inappropriate 
desire of a PBA official to have a police boxing team of his 
                                                          
189 Id. (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 195-96. Indeed, without any further justification, the court 
conclusorily stated, “[w]hile we recognize that dance, when combined with 
nudity, can inexorably convey a message of eroticism, we are not convinced that 
a boxing match, in which police officers participate, inexorably conveys any 
message other than that police officers can be pugilists.” Id. (citations omitted). 
Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a First Amendment 
claim relative to their boxing activity. Id at 196. 
192 Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 195. 
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own.”195 Since PBA plays a crucial role in the NYPD’s official 
business, excluding FFI from the internal communication system 
served the official interests of both the PBA and the NYPD. The 
court averred that “this fact [was] enough . . . to justify giving the 
PBA preferential access to the non-public forum at issue.”196 
Within the forum-analysis framework, several factors opposed 
the police officers’ interest in expressing themselves through the 
sport of boxing. First, FFI did not allege any burden on the 
officers’ boxing activity which would violate the First 
Amendment.197 Second, FFI did not allege facts sufficient to 
indicate that the NYPD’s internal communication system was 
designated “as a place for expressive activity by the public at 
large.”198 Third, FFI did not allege any fact indicating Kelly and 
Bratton denied access to the internal communications system based 
on any viewpoint advocated by FFI.199 
In sum, these cases do not stand for the proposition that boxing 
is incapable of protection under the First Amendment. Instead, in 
each case, there was an overriding policy concern that prevented 
the court from finding that the sport in question falls under the 
ambit of the First Amendment. 
III. BOXING AS EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT 
Contrary to Judge Wolf’s notion in Top Rank, boxers 
communicate more than their desire to win prize money.200 With 
each fight, a boxer must prove that he is the superior fighter. The 
boxer intends to demonstrate this to himself and others who may 
be watching, by his participation in the fight. When a fighter scores 
a knockout or wins on the cards, he has demonstrated to spectators, 
                                                          
195 Id. at 195-96. As an aside, the court noted that had such desire stemmed 
from a reason “that was unconstitutional in and of itself, [e.g.], a desire to form 
an all-white team” would entail a different result. Id. 
196 Id. at 197-98. 
197 Id. at 195. 
198 Id. at 197. 
199 Id. 
200 See Top Rank, 837 So. 2d 496 at 500-02. 
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or at least a panel of judges,201 that he is the better fighter. Indeed, 
one of the most appealing aspects of boxing is that, as a fight, it is 
easily understood by spectators, regardless of their level of 
understanding of the sport. But the sport of boxing communicates 
more that just pugilistic prowess. Whether viewed merely as a 
legalized fight or something more, an analysis of the conduct 
shows that if nude dancing can warrant First Amendment 
protection as expressive conduct, so too should boxing. 
A. Boxing Conveys a Message 
The Supreme Court has held that fighting is not speech.202 
However the sport of boxing removes harmful elements from 
fighting while preserving its status as a form of expressive 
combat.203 While there has been no Supreme Court decision 
addressing the communicative aspects of boxing, the issue of 
whether the expression of hatred through violence can be punished 
separately from the violence itself was considered in Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell.204 The Supreme Court has held that violence that 
produces special harms distinct from their communicative impact 
are entitled to no constitutional protection.205 However, in 
Mitchell, the Court left open the possibility that in the absence of 
“special harms” that remove conduct from First Amendment 
                                                          
201 Either of which would be “those receiving the message” in First 
Amendment parlance. 
202 “[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment.” Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 
476, 484 (1993) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 
(1984) (“[V]iolence or other types of potentially expressive activities that 
produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact . . . are entitled 
to no constitutional protection”) and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment does not protect violence”)). 
203 NED BEAUMONT, CHAMPIONSHIP STREETFIGHTING: BOXING AS A 
MARTIAL ART 8-9 (1997). In other words, boxing is legal, but the safeguards 
present in a boxing match do not detract from its categorization as a form of 
combat able to express its particular message via violence. 
204 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). See also Barclay v. Florida, 
463 U.S. 939 (1983). 
205 Wisconsin, 508 U.S. at 487. 
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protections, physical violence may be expressive speech.206 
1. Nude Dancing as Speech: A Comparison to Boxing 
Boxing matches are fighting demonstrations, thus they have 
expressive qualities similar to erotic performances which have 
garnered First Amendment protection from the Supreme Court.207 
The Supreme Court first indicated that nude dancing was protected 
under the First Amendment in Schad v. Borough of Mt. 
Ephraim.208 But the Supreme Court added a slight modification to 
Schad in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 209 In that case, the Court 
ruled that Indiana’s public-indecency law totally preventing nude 
dancing did not violate the First Amendment.210 The Court held 
that a state may regulate nude dancing so long as the law: (i) is 
clearly within the constitutional power of the state; (ii) furthers 
substantial governmental interests; (iii) is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and (iv) restriction in the statute is 
narrowly tailored.211 
Indiana’s public-indecency statute made it a misdemeanor to 
appear nude in a public place, and it effectively required female 
dancers to wear at least “pasties” and a “G-string” while 
dancing.212 Two “gentlemen’s clubs” in South Bend, Indiana 
wishing to provide all-nude dancing as entertainment, Glen 
Theatre, Inc. and the Kitty Kat Lounge, sued in an Indiana federal 
district court to enjoin the enforcement of Indiana’s public-
                                                          
206 Id. at 487 (“Whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly 
directed at expression (i.e., ‘speech’ or ‘messages’), the statute in this case is 
aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.”). 
207 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), rev’g 904 F.2d 
1081 (1990), rev’g 726 F. Supp. 728 (1985); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 
452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
208 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In Schad, the Court struck down a city ordinance 
prohibiting all live entertainment which was used to shut down a nude dancing 
establishment. The Court noted, “nude dancing is not without its First 
Amendment protections from official regulation.” Id. at 66. 
209 Barnes, 501 U.S. 560. 
210 Id. 
211 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567. 
212 Id. at 563. 
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indecency statute. The plaintiffs claimed that Indiana’s prohibition 
of nudity in public places violated the First Amendment.213 
As a threshold matter, the plurality noted that “nude dancing of 
the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within 
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as 
only marginally so.”214 But the Court also observed that the public 
indecency statute was content-neutral: Indiana has not banned nude 
dancing as such but has proscribed public nudity across the 
board.215 As such, it was subject to intermediate scrutiny.216 
Although nude dancing was symbolic speech, the Court noted 
that it was not entitled to full First Amendment protection: 
[w]hen “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined 
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element 
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms.217 
Consequently, the Court applied the four-part test for regulating 
symbolic speech promulgated under United States v. O’Brien, 
which determined that government regulation of symbolic speech 
is adequately justified: 
[i]f it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.218 
Under the O’Brien test, the Court found Indiana’s public-
indecency statute was justified, in spite of its limitations on an 
expressive activity. First, the statute was clearly within the 
                                                          
213 Id. at 562-64. 
214 Id. at 566. 
215 Id. This is in contrast to Florida’s boxing tax, which is content-based, 
since it regulates only pay-per-view boxing programming, as opposed to pay-
per-view programming across the board. 
216 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567. 
217 Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)). 
218 Id. 
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constitutional power of the state.219 Second, the statute served the 
purpose of “protecting societal order and morality.”220 Third, the 
statute was not directed at the message conveyed by nude dancing, 
but instead reflects public morality; the Court observed, “[t]he 
perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, 
but public nudity.”221 Finally, the Court opined that requiring 
dancers to don pasties and G-strings did not deprive nude dancing 
of its erotic message, but merely made the message “slightly less 
graphic.”222 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that Indiana’s 
public-indecency law should be upheld because it is a “general law 
regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression.”223 
Rather than be held “to some lower level of First Amendment 
scrutiny,” the statute was constitutional because “moral opposition 
to nudity supplied a rational basis for its prohibition.”224 Justice 
Souter also concurred in the judgment, emphasizing the secondary 
effects of nude dancing: 
Legislation seeking to combat the secondary effects of 
adult entertainment need not await localized proof of those 
effects, [and] the State of Indiana could reasonably 
conclude that forbidding nude entertainment of the type 
offered at the Kitty Kat Lounge and the Glen Theatre 
[furthers] its interest in preventing prostitution, sexual 
assault, and associated crimes.225 
Note the statute at issue in Barnes is not analogous to the 
Florida statute at issue in Top Rank.226 Since the Indiana statute is 
not directed at any conduct in particular, it is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien. However, as discussed 
throughout this piece, Florida’s Kershaw Act singles out boxing 
from all other forms of pay-per-view programming and is therefore 
                                                          
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 568. 
221 Id. at 571. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 572. 
224 Id. at 580. 
225 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584. 
226 See supra note 215. 
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subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, there would be no O’Brien 
analysis. Further, unlike the case with Indiana, Florida did not 
enact the Kershaw Act to combat any invidious secondary effects 
of boxing; it is merely a means of raising revenue. As such, the 
Kershaw Act would not meet intermediate scrutiny even if we 
were to assume arguendo that intermediate scrutiny was applicable 
to Florida’s taxation statute. 
2. Boxing’s Message 
Similar to an erotic dancer, a boxer speaks with his “command 
of the body.”227 Through a combination of power and ring 
generalship, boxers engage in a dialogue that “[goes] deep into the 
heart of each other’s matter, [as if] they are [conversing] with their 
physiques.”228 In effect, fighters communicate amongst themselves 
and with their audiences as plainly if they were putting the 
“subtleties of their states in words,” yet they accomplish this end 
entirely using their bodies.229 In On Boxing, Joyce Carol Oates 
                                                          
227 Mailer, supra note 13, at 124. 
228 Id. at 124-25. 
229 In King of the Hill, Norman Mailer commented on the how the personal, 
intimate nature of the boxing, combined with the struggle it depicts, makes 
boxing a form of communication in itself: 
There are languages other than words, languages of symbol and 
languages of nature. There are languages of the body. And 
prizefighting is one of them. There is no attempting to comprehend 
a prizefighter unless we are willing to recognize that he speaks with 
a command of the body which is a detached, subtle, and 
comprehensive in its intelligence as any exercise of mind by such 
social engineers as Herman Kahn or Henry Kissinger. . . . so many a 
good average prizefighter, just a little punchy, does not speak with 
any particular éclat. That doesn’t mean he is incapable of expressing 
himself with wit, style, and an aesthetic flair for surprise when he 
boxes wit his body, any more than Kahn’s obesity would keep us 
from recognizing that his mind can work with strength. Boxing is a 
dialogue between bodies. Ignorant men, usually black, and usually 
next to illiterate, address one another in a set of conversational 
exchanges which go deep into the heart of each other’s matter. It is 
just that they converse with their physiques. . . Boxing is a rapid 
debate between two sets of intelligence. It takes place rapidly 
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characterized boxing as a story without words, and observed that a 
fight is a pure art form rather than a sport.230 Thus, if boxing is the 
message, then the boxing match is the medium. Boxers are akin to 
characters in a play.231 Once the bell rings, the plot unfolds and the 
characters begin to interact in 3 minute scenes. The dialogue 
continues until the climax, where one fighter emerges the better 
man.232 
                                                          
because it is conducted with the body rather than the mind. . . 
[Boxers] speak to each other with their bodies, they signal with their 
clothes. They talk with many a silent telepathic intelligence. And 
doubtless feel the frustration of being unable to express the 
subtleties of their states in words, just as the average middle-class 
white will feel unable to carry out dreams of glory by the uses of his 
body. 
Id. 
230 Oates, supra note 1, at 11. Oates explained: 
Because a boxing match is a story without words, this doesn’t 
mean that it has no text or no language, that it is somehow “brute,” 
“primitive,” “inarticulate,” only that the text is improvised in action; 
the language a dialogue between the boxers of a most refined sort 
(one might say, as much neurological as psychological: a dialogue 
of split-second reflexes) in a joint response to the mysterious will of 
the audience which is always that the fight be a worthy one so that 
the crude paraphernalia of the setting—ring, lights, ropes, stained 
canvas, the staring onlookers themselves—be erased, forgotten. . . 
Ringside announcers give to the wordless spectacles a narrative 
unity, yet boxing as performance is more clearly akin to dance or 
music than narrative. 
231 Id. at 9. 
232 Michael Stephens, Poetics of Boxing, in READING THE FIGHTS, supra 
note 13, at 124. Michael Stephens best articulated the analogy: 
Aristotle placed plot above character, although as plot is 
character, and the reverse, it could also be said that a fighter is the 
fight, too. A fighter brings his character to the fight, but that 
character can only be defined in terms of the course of its actions in 
the ring. The best fights are not Stallone-like pushes and pulls 
between good and evil. . . but rather, in the best cases, two rights 
colliding, or a right and a left, and so on, until the cumulative effect 
of choices unmasks one opponent. In drama it is called the 
recognition scene; in boxing it could be called the telling round. 
Each fight breaks down into those scenes we call rounds. . . Each 
round, like a scene, has its peaks and valleys, its goals, objectives, 
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Boxing is not just a violent interaction and has elements 
differentiating the sport from common streetfights. An example is 
the fighters’ use of gloves. While gloves make a difference in a 
fight, contrary to the common misconception, they do not protect 
fighters from damage done by their opponent’s punches.233 Indeed, 
the 8 to 10 oz. gloves used by professional fighters are too light to 
do so.234 Instead, gloves protect the fighters’ fists from damage 
done by throwing punches throughout the course of a bout.235 The 
boxers’ ability to land punches without hurting their hands 
therefore increases the potential duration of the bout without 
affecting the damage done to the other fighter. 
The division of a boxing match into rounds not only 
distinguishes the sport from a common fight, but also serves to 
further extend the exposition without impacting the basic message. 
Boxing matches are generally divided into up to twelve three-
minute rounds.236 Conversely, street fights are of indeterminate 
duration. Given the strenuous nature of fighting, a chance to rest 
every three minutes allows a boxer to fight longer in the ring than 
on the street, therefore increasing the duration of the fight.237 
Therefore, whereas G-strings and pasties arguably diminished the 
message conveyed by nude dancing, the rules, regulations and 
equipment that differentiate boxing from a streetfight serve to 
                                                          
“through lines,” and obstacles, and the result of ineluctable choices 
creating the rhythm of that action. . . As drama is physicalized this 
way, words, as words becomes actions, boxing speaks to those who 
want to listen to it; ideas are given actions. Like drama, something 
happens, and most often the players are never the same as a result of 
what happens, those various choices; they are changed; they have 
been transformed. 
Id. 
233 BEAUMONT, supra note 203, at 31. 
234 See WORLD BOXING ASSOCIATION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 
GOVERNING CHAMPIONSHIP CONTESTS § 10 (2004) [hereinafter WBA RULES]. 
235 BEAUMONT, supra note 203, at 31-32. 
236 E.g., WBA RULES, supra note 247, at § 10. 
237 One commentator estimated that the ratio of the duration of a street fight 
versus that of a boxing match was 6:1. That is, a street fight will go 30 seconds 
for every three minute round a fighter would be able to last in a bout divided 
into three minute rounds. BEAUMONT, supra note 203, at 8-9. 
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enhance the message transmitted by boxers. 
Finally, civilians generally fight to accomplish either of two 
nonexclusive objectives: pain or possession.238 Through a physical 
attack on a wrongdoer, a person at once denounces a wrongful act 
and restores his own dignity and self-respect.239 The boxer, on the 
                                                          
238 See WALTER J. ONG, FIGHTING FOR LIFE 29 (1981). In Fighting for Life, 
Ong asserts that each participant in a contest of hostility “fights to hurt his 
enemy.” Id. (emphasis added). Nonetheless, he does not expand on how an 
adversary must hurt his enemy. Intuitively, the term “hurt” ought to encompass 
not only physical pain, such as that which would accompany a broken nose, but 
should also include emotional pain, such as the embarrassment of suffering a 
public humiliation. 
 The Second Defenestration of Prague in 1618 is an example of suffering 
emotional pain via public humiliation. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004), WESTLAW, BLACKS (defenestration is the “[a]ct of throwing someone 
or something out a window”). In retaliation to Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand 
II’s attempts to crush Czech Protestantism, an assembly of Protestants found 
several imperial regents guilty of violating the religious-liberty guarantee of 
1609 and subsequently defenestrated them from atop the council room of Prague 
Castle into a pile of manure below. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, 
Prague, Defenestration of (Oct. 31, 2004), 
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?tocId=9375796&query=defenestration&c
t=. See also John L. Hoh, Jr., Defenestration of Prague, available at 
http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/lutheranism/99284. None of the regents 
was seriously hurt as a result of the fall, but they, and the Holy Roman Empire, 
had been publicly humiliated by what they viewed as Protestant Rabble. See 
wordiQ.com, Definition of Defenestrations of Prague, 
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Defenestrations_of_Prague. In fact, the Holy 
Roman Empire was so disgraced by the incident that Ferdinand II was deposed, 
thus ushering in the Thirty Years’ War. See, e.g., infoplease.com, Thirty Years 
War: The Bohemian Period, http://www.infoplease. 
com/ce6/history/A0861529.html. 
 In sum, the Holy Roman Empire was “hurt” by the Second Defenestration 
because its monarch was deposed and a long and bloody struggle raged 
throughout Europe as a result. Yet the incident itself caused little, if any, 
physical pain to the defeated adversaries. This illustration proves that physical 
pain is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition to “hurt” one’s enemy in a 
contest of hostility. 
239 There is a similarity between the concept of reprobation in a fisticuffs, 
on one hand, and the concept of “public prejudice” in antebellum American 
dueling. See C.A. Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and 
Social Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1808-11 (2001). 
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other hand, aims simultaneously to dominate his opponent and 
affirm his identity as a superior fighter. By inflicting pain upon his 
opponent this time, a boxer also seeks to dissuade the opponent 
from future challenges “in order to avoid further unpleasantness, as 
well as, to communicate to others that he will not tolerate similar 
challenges.240 A fighter wants to “make an example” out of his 
adversary.241 Finally, a boxer may also fight to exert possession 
over a trophy or a championship belt. Although this can be viewed 
as a contest for possession over an object, it is also symbolic of the 
message of self-affirmation—the trophy or belt is the physical 
embodiment of the concept “may the best man win”—the belt 
holder is the champion of the world, affirming that he is the best 
fighter in his weight class. 
B. Boxing’s Message is Understood by its Audience 
Boxers convey a message that is not only likely to be 
understood by their audience, but is in fact understood by their 
audience.242 Boxing is like no other sport.243 Indeed, the term 
                                                          
“‘Public prejudice’ demanded that a gentleman either defend his honor in a duel 
or else sacrifice the respect of his peers.” Id. at 1809. Indeed, the act of dueling 
itself communicated to others “that the duelists were men of honor.” Id. at 1810. 
This resembles the expression inherent in a modern street fight: participation 
such a fight evinces the participant’s will to defend his honor by fighting to 
simultaneously decry his opponent’s malicious acts and reinstate his own self-
worth. 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 2 (15th ed. Supp. 
Nov. 2003), WESTLAW, CRIMLAW at 2 [hereinafter WHARTON]. 
240 See WHARTON, supra note 252, at 3. 
241 See id. 
242 See e.g., Robert W. Enzenauer & Patrick J. Kelly, The Borrowed 
Imagery of Boxing, 264 JAMA 1531 (1990). In The Borrowed Imagery of 
Boxing, the authors discuss the use of boxing imagery in Pfizer’s promotion of 
their antibiotic Cefobid. Id. Pfizer touted Cefobid as “the infection fighter that 
defeats nosocomial pneumonia and knocks out infections.” Id. To illustrate the 
slogan, a series of ads pictured a boxer’s hands raised in victory, a pair of 
boxing gloves, or a pair of boxing trunks. Id. Pfizer stated that they used the 
borrowed imagery of boxing as a way to communicate graphically “the image of 
strength and power, and the ability to triumph over infections.” Id. 
243 See generally Oates, supra note 1, at 8-11. 
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“sport” does not do justice to categorizing the “Sweet Science.”244 
At once, it is an amorphous conglomeration of art, drama and sport 
packaged in three-minute increments. It defies neat categorization. 
As Joyce Carol Oates remarked in her seminal work, On Boxing, 
about boxing’s impact on her: 
Nor can I think of boxing in writerly terms as a 
metaphor for something else. No one . . . is likely to think 
of boxing as a symbol of something beyond itself, as if its 
uniqueness were merely an abbreviation, or iconographic; 
though I can entertain the proposition that life is a metaphor 
for boxing—for one of those bouts that go on and on, round 
following round, jabs, missed punches, clinches, nothing 
determined, again the bell and again you and your opponent 
so evenly matched it’s impossible not to see that your 
opponent is you: and why this struggle on an elevated 
platform enclosed by ropes as in a pen beneath hot crude 
pitiless lights in the presence of an impatient crowd?—that 
sort of hellish-writerly metaphor. Life is like boxing in 
many unsettling respects. But boxing is only like boxing.245 
At the most rudimentary level, boxing is a fight sanctioned by 
the state that pits two fighters together in a struggle.246 The goal is 
simple: defeat your opponent.247 The message sent in doing so is 
                                                          
244 The phrase “sweet science of boxing” (commonly shortened to “sweet 
science”) was popularized by A.J. Liebling, a literary journalist and the author 
of a collection of articles in the 1950s entitled The Sweet Science. Liebling 
borrowed the expression from Pierce Egan, who in the 1700s wrote a collection 
of boxing articles entitled Boxiana. See Jon Christensen, The Sweet Science of 
Stories, available at http://www.greatbasinweb.com/gb2-2/sweetstories.htm 
(1997). 
245 Oates, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis in original). 
246 That is, sanctioned by the state. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 548.008, supra 
note 12. 
Considered in the abstract the boxing ring is an altar of sorts, one 
of those legendary spaces where the laws of a nation are suspended: 
inside the ropes, during an officially regulated three-minute round, a 
man may be killed at his opponent’s hands but he cannot legally be 
murdered. 
Oates, supra note 1, at 19. 
247 This can be accomplished either by knocking out your opponent, or 
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understood by those who view a match.248 Each boxing match is a 
story, “a unique and highly condensed drama without words.”249 
Boxers are there to establish themselves in front of the fans, their 
trainers, and the world250 in “a public accounting of the outermost 
limits of their beings.”251 Boxers communicate “what physical and 
psychic power they possess—of how much or how little they are 
capable.”252 The objective message received by the audience is 
readily apparent: “‘the Sweet Science of Bruising’ celebrates the 
physicality of men, even as it dramatizes the limitations, 
sometimes tragic, more often poignant, of the physical.”253 Oates 
observed, “To enter the ring near-naked and to risk one’s life is to 
make of one’s audience voyeurs of a kind: boxing is so 
intimate.”254 
Expressing oneself to society through boxing is not a novel 
endeavor. As far back as Ancient Greece, boxers were viewed as 
heroes much in the same vain as Heracles and Ajax.255 Combat 
sports champions256 received heroes’ honors, and were more 
                                                          
outscoring him on the judges’ scorecards. See WBA RULES § § 1, 3 (delineating 
ways in which a boxer can win a fight). 
248 Indeed, there is more expressed than simply the desire to win prize 
money. For example, amateur bouts, which can be some of the most ferocious 
confrontations, often have no fight purse. If the message communicated by 
participants in the sport of boxing is one of greed, as asserted by the Top Rank 
court, how would they categorize the message in these prizeless prizefights? 
249 Oates, supra note 1, at 8. 
250 This is especially true in the case of global telecasts. But needless to 
say, boxing is a truly global sport, hence why the top prize is “champion of the 
world.” Fighters come from, and compete, all around the world (e.g., Mike 
Tyson (U.S.A.), Lennox Lewis (U.K.), Vitali Klitschko (Germany via 
Kazakhstan), Roberto Duran (Panama), Hector “Macho” Camacho (Mexico), 
David Tua (New Zealand), Ben Tackie (Ghana), Yoshihiro Irei (Japan)). As a 
result, even in the early days of their careers, boxers compete in a global arena 
and try to make a name for themselves in the eyes of the world. 
251 Oates, supra note 1, at 8. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 7. 
255 See COMBAT SPORTS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD at 128-29. supra note 11 
256 E.g., boxing, wrestling and pankration (a Greek sport combining boxing, 
kicking, wrestling throws, strangle holds and pressure locks). See id. at 54. 
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revered than even soldiers who had fallen in battle.257 Fighters 
distinguished themselves as individual champions, much in the 
way that Homer’s great warriors had sought out and defeated 
suitable opponents for themselves in the melees of the Iliad.258 
These champions brought “delight and honor” to their city-states, 
and were viewed as public benefactors, a reflection of the high 
esteem and regard held for boxing.259 Like his counterpart in 
Ancient Greece, a modern boxer strives to be seen by his audience 
“not only to be a champion but to be a great champion—an 
immortal.”260 
Despite the passage of millennia since boxing’s inception, the 
status of the modern boxer-hero persists.261 Regarding the modern 
applicability of the Hellenic hero-athlete, Nietzsche remarked, 
“[e]very talent must unfold itself in fighting.”262 But prowess in the 
ring garners more than mere recognition as a role model or talented 
athlete for the modern boxer. There is still a link between the 
fighter and his audience, similar to that between the ancient 
pugilist and his audience.263 His performance in the ring 
communicates to the audience who he is as a person and where he 
stands in society.264 Like his Greco-Roman counterpart, a boxer’s 
feats of pugilism serve to immortalize him in the eyes of 
spectators.265 
However, boxing’s message is not confined to the concept of 
status. Especially in the twentieth century, boxing was a vehicle of 
                                                          
257 Id. at 128. 
258 Id. at 113. 
259 Id. at 128. 
260 Oates, supra note 1, at 6. 
261 Anthony J. Cortese, The Notre Dame Bengal Bouts: Symbolic 
Immortality Through Sport, 8/1/97 J. SPORT BEHAV. 347 (1997), available at 
1997 WL 12852129 (discussing the role of the modern boxer as a hero-
immortal). 
262 See Oates, supra note 1, at 9. 
263 Cortese, supra note 261, at *4. 
264 Id. Cortese noted, “[p]ublics are served by [boxers] and make active 
demands on them; they provide role-support (and, occasionally, nonsupport).” 
Id. 
265 Id. 
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social communication and change. In 1910, for example, boxing 
broke down the color barrier in American professional sports.266 In 
that year, Jack Johnson, a black fighter, fought for the heavyweight 
title against Jim Jeffries, a white fighter dubbed the “Great White 
Hope,” in what was called “a fight for all the racial marbles.”267 
Until this point, there had never been a black heavyweight 
champion.268 This was largely a function of the remnant of post-
Civil War racism that labeled blacks as inferior, as well as some 
deft maneuvering by those who determined which fighters could 
qualify for a shot at the title.269 The fight was advertised as “a 
match of civilization and virtue against savagery and baseness.”270 
Despite the controversy, and a nation’s collective denial that a 
black man could be heavyweight champion, the fight took place as 
scheduled in Las Vegas, Nevada.271 Johnson conducted himself 
with grace and decorum, responding to the crowd’s numerous 
boos, jeers and epithets in a manner that Collier’s described as “the 
good sense [and] cleverness to keep the respectful ingratiating 
ways of the Southern [black].”272 Likewise, in response to the 
racially charged taunts of Jeffries and his corner man, former 
heavyweight champ “Gentleman” Jim Corbett, Johnson “politely 
responded and smiled.”273 
More importantly, Johnson rose above his opponent in terms of 
boxing ability.274 Johnson completely dominated Jeffries for fifteen 
rounds; he definitively proved himself the better fighter.275 Finally, 
                                                          
266 See generally RANDY ROBERTS, PAPA JACK: JACK JOHNSON AND THE 
ERA OF WHITE HOPES 85-107 (1985). 
267 Id. at 85-86. 
268 Id. at 86-90. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 85. White America was so offended by the prospect of a black 
champion that they launched a myriad of protests to stop the fight altogether, 
including a letter writing campaign, where the Governor of California received 
nearly 1 million postcards imploring, “STOP THE FIGHT, THIS IS THE 20TH 
CENTURY.” Id. at 94. 
271 Id. at 104. 
272 ROBERTS, supra note 266, at 105. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 105-07. 
275 Id. Some commentators at the time believed that Johnson was merely 
STEIN MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:36 PM 
 PAY-PER-VIEW BOXING TAXATION 1045 
late in the fifteenth round, Johnson launched a barrage of over 
twenty punches to Jeffries’s bloodied and swollen face. Tens 
seconds later, Jack Johnson became the first black heavyweight 
champion of the world.276 Thus, by breaking the color barrier with 
respect to the heavyweight championship, Jack Johnson used 
boxing to prove to the world that blacks were not inferior and were 
capable athletes. His feats in the ring on that day in 1910 paved the 
way for future black athletes to compete on equal ground in 
mainstream professional sports. His victory transcended the ring, 
as it was a milestone in healing the wounds of slavery and creating 
an integrated society in America.277 
Boxing was also used to fire America’s first shots against 
Nazism during World War II. On June 22, 1938, Joe Louis, a black 
American, fought a rematch against Max Schmeling, the German 
heavyweight champion of the world, in a bout that pitted the free 
world against Nazism.278 At the time of the fight, the Nazi machine 
had already begun to engulf Europe into its cloud of fascist 
oppression.279 During this dark time, Americans looked to Joe 
Louis as their bastion of good, standing against the evil that the 
Nazis represented.280 
The symbolism of the match was readily apparent in the press 
coverage of the fight. Americans believed that doling out a defeat 
to Schmeling, an Aryan, at the hands of a black fighter would 
                                                          
toying with Jeffries, and could have ended the fight much earlier, but instead 
wanted to humiliate his opponent and make him suffer for his remarks made 
before and during the fight. Id. at 105-06. 
276 Id. 
277 See id. at 13. 
278 See generally CHRIS MEAD, CHAMPION JOE LOUIS: BLACK HERO IN 
WHITE AMERICA 139-42 (Penguin Sports Library ed. 1986). 
279 See id. at 139. 
280 Id. at 139-40. Rumors about the actors in the fight evince the sentiment 
at the time. For example, there were rumors that Adolf Hitler would make 
Schmeling Minister of Sport if he defeated Louis, and that Schmeling said that 
no black man could beat a member of the master race. Id. at 139. Another rumor 
was that Max Machon, Schmeling’s trainer, had a Nazi uniform in his closet. Id. 
Even though these rumors proved to be false, Joe Louis was “led to hate 
Schmeling and what the Nazis stood for.” Id. 
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disgrace the Nazi propaganda machine.281 In addition to fears that 
a Louis defeat would represent a victory for the Nazis, Americans 
were also concerned that if a German became champion, Hitler 
would effectively steal the title from America for good.282 In sum, 
Germans, via Schmeling, represented “one of the worst enemies in 
the world,” and Joe Louis was America’s great hope in defeating 
the enemy.283 
Given the dramatic hype surrounding the bout, the event itself 
was almost anticlimactic. Living up to his nickname “the Brown 
Bomber,” Louis quickly pummeled Schmeling into submission.284 
Schmeling landed only one punch before his corner man Max 
Machon threw in the towel to end the fight.285 In the end, Joe 
Louis, deemed racially inferior by the Nazis, defeated an “Aryan 
superman,” proving to the world that so-called Aryans were not the 
superior beings that Nazi propaganda had made them out to be and, 
                                                          
281 Id. at 140. One newswire reported: 
German fans leave only one choice for [Schmeling]—a 
comeback. His German admirers—and there are millions, from 
Reichsfürer Hitler down—hate the thought of defeat. . . . 
Newspapers do not say it, but it is tacitly understood that a Louis 
victory would be taken [in Germany] as a disgrace from the Nazi 
racial viewpoint. 
Id. 
282 Id. at 140. One reporter feared that Schmeling wanted the title on behalf 
of himself and the German nation, and if successful would never again allow an 
American to vie for it. Id. Another journalist posited that even if American 
preclusion were farfetched, “Nobody with a sense of fairness wants to see the 
next heavyweight championship fight staged in the land bossed by Hitler.” Id. 
283 Id. at 141. On the eve of the bout, a journalist in New York stated: 
Race prejudice should have no place in sports. But Hitler has 
created a situation which the civilized world cannot and will not 
overlook. In trying to prove that the Germans are supreme in all 
things he has made an 18-karat jackass of himself and caused the 
Nazis to be despised throughout the world. . . . Using sentiment—
and judgment too—I choose Joe Louis, an American Negro, to beat 
the ears off Max. 
Id. 
284 Bob Considine, The Second Louis-Schmeling Fight, in FIRESIDE BOOK 
OF BOXING 83 (W.C. Heinz ed. 1961). 
285 Id. 
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more importantly, that they could be beaten. 
C. Boxing Passes the Spence Test as Conduct that is First 
Amendment Speech 
History demonstrates that boxing is within the ambit of the 
First Amendment, but the Top Rank court overlooked this 
historical analysis.286 The Top Rank decision reflects modern 
courts’ narrow notion of symbolism, whereby courts accept 
conduct as symbolic if it can easily be categorized into concrete 
concepts.287 For example, wearing a black armband288 or burning a 
draft card289 evinced messages that one is protesting the Vietnam 
War. Burning a flag evinced discontent with the Reagan 
administration.290 Thus, physical conduct labeled 
“communication” can be boiled down by the courts into tangible 
words, numbers or symbols, e.g., nude dancing conveys 
“eroticism.”291 Although the expression inherent in boxing cannot 
be neatly categorized, it is expressive conduct that conveys a 
specific message that has a substantial likelihood of being 
understood nonetheless.292 A boxer speaks with a language of the 
                                                          
286 Top Rank, 837 So. 2d at 500. The court conclusorily stated that boxers 
can only communicate their desire to win prize money. 
287 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
288 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560; Spence, 418 U.S. 405; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968). 
289 O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 
290 Johnson, 491 U.S. 397. 
291 Barnes, 501 U.S. 560. 
292 Norman Mailer, King of the Hill, in JOYCE CAROL OATES & DANIEL 
HALPERN, READING THE FIGHTS 124 (1988). In King of the Hill, Norman Mailer 
lamented on this very point: 
[T]wo great fighters in a great fight travel down subterranean rivers 
of exhaustion and cross mountain peaks of agony, stare at the light of 
their own death in the eye of the man they are fighting, travel into the 
crossroads of the most excruciating choice of karma as they get up 
from the floor against all the appeal of the sweet swooning 
catacombs of oblivion—it is just that we do not see them this way, 
because they are not primarily men of words, and this is the century 
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body that defies words, yet communicates a message.293 
Despite court determinations that professional wrestling,294 
figure skating,295 recreational surfing,296 recreational roller 
skating,297 and college football298 are unworthy of First 
Amendment protection, the Spence test calls for a sport-by-sport 
analysis. Boxing is distinct from any other sport.299 Unlike football 
and other team sports, there is an individual focus in boxing.300 
Since each side is represented by only one individual, emphasis is 
squarely on the two players fighting for superiority in the “squared 
circle.”301 In this way, the more intimate nature of boxing delivers 
a more “particularized” message than does a team sport.302 
Indeed, individual expression is the core of boxing because 
boxers must express their individual role-identity to their 
audience.303 “One does not play boxing”;304 as a survival game, 
                                                          
of words, numbers, and symbols. Enough. 
Id. 
293 Mailer, supra note 13, at 124-25. 
294 Murdock, 361 F. Supp. 1083. 
295 Post, 510 F. Supp. 81. 
296 MacDonald, 437 F. Supp. 796. 
297 Sunset Amusement, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768. 
298 Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356. 
299 See e.g., Oates, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
300 Football and other team sports are better viewed as the collective action 
of many individuals. While each athlete doubtless has a back story, and the 
teams are playing for a common goal, collective action presents a difficulty in 
that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible for many to come together and 
convey a particularized message other than the collective desire to score and 
win. Further, boxing is a fight—primal instinct, yet a language in itself. Since 
time immemorial, fighting has conveyed a message—dominance over territory 
or an item, rightful partner to a mate, etc. Thus, team sports lack the expressive 
dialogue-like quality inherent in boxing. 
301 It is even different than professional wrestling, which is generally a 
scripted match, and is more akin to pure entertainment. There is an alternative 
argument that due to its substantial pure entertainment component, pro wrestling 
should receive First Amendment protection in the way a play or film would. 
However, to pursue this argument would go beyond the scope of this note. 
302 See e.g., Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356. 
303 Regarding the Bengal Bouts at Notre Dame, Cortese observed: 
Since [a boxing match is] a public event and because the 
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boxing expresses an image of humanity and the struggle for self-
preservation in a manner that other sports do not.305 Boxing’s 
                                                          
distinction between success and failure in boxing is clear (one either 
wins or loses), the boxer must put his role-identity on the line. 
Unlike some other sports (e.g., football, hockey, soccer), there are 
no ties. Boxing is ultimately an individual rather than team effort. 
There is no one to replace you; you cannot call time-out after you 
have been knocked punch-drunk with a vicious uppercut to the chin. 
You cannot rest when you have had the wind knocked out of you 
with a sweeping hook to the mid-section. 
Cortese, supra note 261, at *4-5. 
304 Oates, supra note 1, at 20 
305 Id at 20-21. Oates observed: 
I have no difficulty justifying boxing as a sport because I have 
never thought of it as a sport. . . There is nothing fundamentally 
playful about it; nothing that seems to belong to daylight, to 
pleasure. At its moments of greatest intensity it seems to contain so 
complete and so powerful an image of life—life’s beauty, 
vulnerability, despair, incalculable and often self-destructive 
courage—that boxing is life, and hardly a mere game. During a 
superior match . . . we are deeply moved by the body’s communion 
with itself by way of another’s intransigent flesh. The body’s 
dialogue with its shadow-self—or Death. Baseball, football, 
basketball—these quintessentially American pastimes are 
recognizably sports because they involve play: they are games. One 
plays football, one does not play boxing. 
Observing team sports, teams of adult men, one sees how men 
are children in the most felicitous sense of the word. But boxing in 
its elemental ferocity cannot be assimilated into childhood . . . 
Spectators at public games derive much of their pleasure from 
reliving the communal emotions of childhood but spectators at 
boxing matches relive the murderous infancy of the race. 
Considered in the abstract the boxing ring is an altar of sorts, one 
of those legendary spaces where the laws of a nation are suspended: 
inside the ropes, during an officially regulated three-minute round, a 
man may be killed at his opponent’s hands but he cannot legally be 
murdered. Boxing inhabits a sacred space predating civilization; or, 
to use D.H. Lawrence’s phrase, before God was love. If it suggests a 
savage ceremony or a rite of atonement it also suggests the futility 
of such gestures. For what possible atonement is the fight waged if 
it must shortly be waged against . . . and again? The boxing match is 
the very image, the more terrifying for being so stylized, of 
mankind’s collective aggression; its ongoing historical madness. 
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exhibition of the individual in his most basic and savage state sets 
it apart from other sports.306 Each boxer’s individual message of 
survival and prowess combine in an expressive manner that 
satisfies the Spence test.307 As to the first prong of Spence, the 
fighter subjectively intends to communicate his ability to survive. 
Further, as to the second prong, by participating in the sport, 
spectators are likely to understand that the boxer is trying to do so. 
As demonstrated by the decision in Top Rank, there are 
significant policy interests weighing in favor of categorizing 
boxing as protected speech. If the Top Rank decision stands, other 
states will promulgate content-based taxes on pay-per-view boxing 
programming similar to the Kershaw Act. Indeed, Pennsylvania 
has already done so.308 This could exacerbate the current split 
amongst courts that have examined boxing taxes. On the one hand, 
Top Rank would allow content-based measures to stand. On the 
other hand, TVKO and U.S. Satellite dictate that such measures are 
repugnant to the First Amendment. 
In addition, Florida’s Kershaw Act “imposes a financial 
penalty on Direct Broadcast Satellite [(DBS)] providers that offer 
viewers programming involving boxing, and ultimately penalizes 
viewers themselves based on the content of the programs they 
choose to watch.”309 The Kershaw Act thus limits programming 
choices for viewers outside of Florida. Since DBS providers 
broadcast identical telecasts to subscribers throughout the 
continental United States, the Kershaw Act may cause DBS 
providers not to offer programming that gives rise to the tax: 
[where] DBS providers choose not to offer pay-per-view 
telecasts involving boxing (or to offer fewer such telecasts) 
                                                          
Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, even individual sports such as figure skating, 
where there would ostensibly be more potential for individualized expression, 
do not transmit as powerful a message as boxing because they cannot provide 
the same concentrated expression of the human condition as does boxing. 
306 Id. 
307 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
308 5 PA. CONS. STAT. § 916 (2004) (promoters must pay 3% tax on gross 
receipts of in-state pay-per-view telecasts). 
309 Brief for the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 1. U.S. Satellite, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113. 
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because of the costs that Florida’s tax imposes on such 
programming, then subscribers in other parts of the 
country—including those states where courts have 
invalidated taxes identical to Florida’s—may suffer a 
corresponding decrease in available programming 
content.310 
A disparity among states’ regulation of satellite television 
broadcasts would visit significant administrative burdens upon 
pay-per-view providers. As a result, identical transmissions would 
“[give] rise to differing obligations, depending on the jurisdiction 
of the subscriber.”311 
These increased burdens and costs, coupled with the decrease 
in programming available to viewers resulting from taxes such as 
the Kershaw Act, outweigh the importance of generating increased 
revenue in a single state. 
CONCLUSION 
Florida is one of numerous states to authorize a tax specific to 
telecasts of boxing. As these taxes are specific to a type of 
television programming, they should be held by courts to be 
content-based restrictions on speech. However, boxing and other 
sports have been denied the protections of the First Amendment 
because they are deemed to be non-expressive. An historical and 
literary analysis of boxing demonstrates that the sport satisfies the 
Spence test because boxers intend to express particularized 
messages which are understood by their audiences. When strict 
scrutiny is applied to taxes on boxing telecasts, the state’s interest 
in raising revenue is outweighed by boxers’—and their 
promoters’—freedom of expression. 
 
                                                          
310 Br. for the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association as 
Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Petitioner at 4-5. 
311 Br. for the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association as 
Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Petitioner at 13. 
